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Abstract 
This paper analyses how the functional components and sub-components of 
government expenditures are affected by fiscal consolidations. A fixed-effects estimator is 
employed over a panel of 15 European Union countries during the period 1990-2012. The 
results show that spending on public services increases during fiscal consolidations, while 
spending on defence, public order, health, education and social protection is significantly cut. 
A more disaggregated analysis proves that fiscal consolidations are harmful for important 
social expenditures, in particular, for those related to citizens‟ safety, health assistance, social 
protection and investment in human capital. This evidence is even stronger in a particular 
group of countries, known in the literature as PIIGS. Hence, fiscal consolidations can have 
important implications on the living standards of the more economically vulnerable citizens. 
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1. Introduction 
The consolidation efforts observed in several countries have motivated academics to 
analyse the characteristics and the empirical determinants of fiscal consolidation 
programmes. The rising of public deficits and debts in the aftermath of the recent Great 
Recession have revived the interest on this issue. 
The funds transferred by fiscal authorities to rescue the banking sector and the 
discretionary measures adopted by several European Union (EU) governments, in 
particular, to boost the economic activity, led to considerable fiscal deficits and pushed 
government debts to historically high levels. This forced EU countries to abandon those 
expansionary fiscal policies and to implement austerity programmes. The Greek crisis 
boosted this process, as countries wanted to convince the markets that they were in a better 
position. Hence, several consolidations and austerity packages started to be implemented. 
While EU institutions emphasize the importance of fiscal consolidations as a 
requirement for sustainable growth, the US consider that they may hurt short-term growth 
and longer adjustment periods should be allowed. Assessing the trade-off between 
consolidation of public finances and economic growth is fundamental for the formulation of 
effective policies. Several studies look at this relation and try to identify the determinants, 
impact, timing and the length of fiscal consolidations (Alesina et al., 2008; Alesina and 
Ardagna, 2010; Barrios et al., 2010; Cimadomo et al., 2010; Sanz, 2011; Cimadomo, 2012; 
Agnello et al., 2013; Ball et al., 2013; Bi et al., 2013; Afonso and Jalles, 2014; Anderson et 
al. 2014; Agnello and Sousa, 2014; Cafiso and Cellini, 2014; Agnello el al., 2015; 
Cugnasca and Rother, 2015; Afonso and Jalles, 2016; Agnello et al., 2016). Others take 
into account the kind of consolidation to show that successful consolidations are primarily 
based on spending cuts rather than increasing taxes (Alesina and Perotti, 1995, 1997, 1998; 
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McDermott and Wescott, 1996; Buti and Sapir, 1998; Forni et al., 2010; Afonso and Jalles 
2012; Erceg and Linde, 2013; Heylen et al., 2013, among others). 
However, as far as we are concerned, no study on fiscal consolidations looks at their 
impact on the functional components of public expenditure. Sanz (2011) explores the 
relationship between the components of government expenditure and the government size, 
but he does not account for fiscal consolidation spells. A few other papers have also looked 
at those components but from a political perspective (see, for instance, Potrafke, 2010; 
Katsimi and Sarantides, 2012; Enkelman and Leibrecht, 2013; Morozoumi et al., 2014; 
Castro and Martins, 2016a, b). They analyse whether and how electoral motives, 
government ideology and political support affect the components of public expenditures, 
but they are silent regarding the role of fiscal consolidations. 
The knowledge of how fiscal consolidations affect spending on education, health, 
social protection, public services, among others, is of the most importance for an adequate 
design of fiscal consolidation programmes. Knowing their impact on those components 
allows fiscal authorities to take action to mitigate the negative economic and social effects 
of fiscal consolidations and to avoid the deterioration of the well-being of the more 
vulnerable citizens. If the adjustments rely essentially on expenditure cuts in education, 
health or social protection, for example, – to reduce the public deficit and debt quickly – the 
middle and lower classes in a society will feel the pinch more intensively than richer 
citizens. This can lead to higher income inequalities (Agnello and Sousa, 2014), social and 
political instability (Agnello et al., 2014b) and human development (Agnello et al., 2015b). 
This analysis represents an important step forward relatively to the previous 
literature, as it allows us to identify and understand which items inside the components of 
public expenditure are being more significantly affected by the fiscal consolidation 
processes and, as so, infer about the social consequences for the most vulnerable citizens. 
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A fixed-effects estimator is used in the empirical analysis and the results show that 
spending on public services increases during fiscal consolidations, while spending on 
defence, public order, health, education and social protection is significantly cut. A more 
disaggregated analysis proves that fiscal consolidations are harmful for important social 
public expenditures, undermining citizens‟ safety, health assistance, investment in human 
capital and social protection. Public services are likely to be increased due to a rise in 
public debt transactions observed during periods of fiscal consolidation. All this evidence 
has proved to be stronger in a particular group of countries, here called PIIGS. 
This article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a brief review of the relevant 
literature. Section 3 describes the data and presents the econometric model. The main 
results are presented and discussed in section 4 and section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Literature review 
The studies on fiscal consolidations have concentrated the attention on the factors 
that influence their implementation. The state of public finances and the economic 
conditions have been regarded in the literature as the most important conditionings of fiscal 
consolidations (Perotti, 1999; Giavazzi et al., 2000; Blanchard and Perotti, 2002; Alesina et 
al., 2008; Barrios et al., 2010; Agnello, Caporale and Sousa, 2013; Agnello et al., 2014a; 
Anderson et al., 2014; Afonso and Jalles, 2016). Fiscal consolidations are usually 
implemented when the stance of governments is weak, frequently related to large public 
debts; the domestic economy is not always thriving as expected and ends up being 
negatively affected by the austerity measures in the short-term. In the long-run, the 
economy tends to recover, but in some cases/countries and under certain conditions it may 
take quite a long time (Anderson et al., 2014). 
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Blanchard and Perotti (2002) show that positive government spending shocks 
increase output and private consumption and have a crowding-out effect over private 
investment, while positive tax shocks have a negative effect on output and private 
spending. On the contrary, Afonso and Jalles (2014) show that during consolidations, lower 
government consumption increases private consumption. This effect is higher for countries 
with lower debt levels, implying that more successful consolidations might be associated 
with reduced crowding-out effects. Nevertheless, this debate is far from reaching an 
agreement, as some recent studies have shown that several countries are now facing 
uncertainty about the effects of fiscal measures on the economic activity (Cimadomo, 2012; 
Cimadomo et al., 2012; Anderson et al., 2014), as well as regarding the duration of such 
adjustment programs (Agnello et al., 2013). 
Other studies focus on the impact of fiscal consolidations on income distribution. 
Coenen et al. (2008) argue that depending on the fiscal instrument used, fiscal 
consolidations may have pronounced distributional effects. Furceri et al. (2015) show that 
fiscal consolidations increase income inequality and lower wage income shares in the short 
and medium-term. Agnello and Sousa (2014) also uncover a significant widening of the 
income gap during episodes of fiscal consolidation. Moreover, Mulas-Granados (2005) 
finds that successful fiscal consolidations are associated with higher income inequality, 
while Afonso and Jalles (2012) show that the stance of the cyclically adjusted primary 
balance and the duration of the consolidations can contribute to their success. 
The timing, size, and composition of the austerity measures are other important 
factors that can affect a fiscal consolidation, its likelihood of success and duration (von 
Hagen and Strauch, 2001; von Hagen et al., 2002; Agnello et al., 2013; Agnello et al., 
2015a; Agnello et al., 2016). In terms of timing, gradual consolidations are considered to be 
more successful than quick adjustments. However, Barrios et al. (2010) show that when 
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public debt is very high and the economy is not growing, quick measures might be the best 
option. In the same line, von Hagen et al. (2002) also notice that when a fiscal 
consolidation lasts for a long period of time it can be affected by fatigue and the 
consolidation process might be reversed. Giavazzi and Pagano (1996) and von Hagen and 
Strauch (2001) put the emphasis on the size of the fiscal consolidations, which can indicate 
the extent of the governments‟ commitment to achieve long-term sustainability in public 
debt. In addition, Molnár (2012) notices that large consolidations need multiple instruments 
for the consolidation to succeed. 
Regarding the composition, Alesina and Perotti (1995, 1997, 1998), McDermott and 
Wescott (1996), Buti and Sapir (1998), Forni et al. (2010), Erceg and Linde (2013) and 
Heylen et al. (2013) show that spending-driven fiscal consolidation programs have better 
conditions to be successful than fiscal adjustments that rely essentially on tax increases and 
cuts in investment. Agnello et al. (2013) provide additional evidence that spending-driven 
consolidations are shorter than tax-driven consolidations and that the size of the 
consolidation program does not significantly affect the duration of fiscal consolidations. 
Moreover, Molnár (2012) shows that spending-driven adjustments are more likely to 
stabilise public debt than revenue-driven ones. In this context, the business cycle literature 
corroborates the idea that tax-cuts are more effective in stimulating the economic activity 
than higher government spending, but the importance of tax cuts versus higher government 
spending has been in debate among policymakers and economists for a long time (see, 
among others, Garcia and Henin, 1999; Mountford and Uhlig, 2009; Jha et al., 2014; Hur et 
al., 2014). 
However, as far as we are concerned, no study on fiscal consolidations looks at their 
impact on the functional components of public expenditure. Sanz (2011) explores the 
relationship between components of government expenditure and government size in 25 
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developed countries and shows that fiscal discipline affects public spending composition. 
However, he does not identify fiscal consolidation spells; he only accounts for changes in 
the size of the government. That is not a suitable approach to understand how the 
components of public expenditure behave during fiscal consolidations. As the size of the 
government is measured by dividing total government spending by GDP, it accounts for 
effects from the level of total government spending and the economic cycle. Hence, we 
cannot learn much on the actual effect of fiscal consolidations. 
Other few papers that look at the behaviour of the functional components of public 
expenditure take a political perspective. Potrafke (2010) finds that incumbents increase the 
growth of public health expenditures in election years, while Enkelman and Leibrecht 
(2013) conclude that election cycles are mainly found in the new democracies of Eastern 
Europe and in categories such as social welfare, general public services, environmental 
protection and infrastructures. More recently, Castro and Martins (2016a, b) found political 
opportunism mainly in health, education, social welfare and general public services.
1
 In 
this paper, we take a step forward and analyse how fiscal consolidations affect the 
components of public expenditure in a panel of 15 EU countries. We look not only at the 
first level of the functional components but also at their sub-components. The exploration 
of effects in the sub-levels of government expenditures is expected to provide a finer 
understanding of the impact of fiscal consolidations. 
We also provide a comparative analysis between a particular group of countries, 
known in the literature as PIIGS (Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain) and the other 
ten EU countries considered in this study. The PIIGS are known for being more “relaxed” 
with their public accounts. They were also recently affected by unfavourable economic and 
                                                             
1  Considering an economic decomposition of public expenditures, Katsimi and Sarantides (2012) and 
Morozoumi et al. (2014) show that elections tend to shift public spending towards current expenditures at the 
cost of public investment. 
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financial conditions and increasing public deficits and debts. The unfavourable conditions 
that they have faced (recession and unemployment), the high levels of public deficits and 
debts that they present and the difficulties that they have felt in borrowing money to finance 
their economies were critical to account for this distinction. Moreover, due to those 
problems, they were forced to implement severe fiscal packages and some needed external 
financial assistant to overcome their financial and/or fiscal unbalances. This means that this 
study must give a special attention to this group of countries. 
 
3. Data and model specification 
To analyse the impact of fiscal consolidations on the functional components of 
government expenditures, we collected annual data for the 15 countries that were members 
of the European Union in the end of the 1990s. The main reason to consider only those EU 
countries is that the disaggregated data for other EU countries is of poor quality. Even for 
the selected countries, the available data provided by the Eurostat database for the 
functional components of public expenditure covers only the period 1990-2012.
2
 Hence, 
we are forced to restrict our study to that time period. 
The analysis developed in this study is based on a break-down of government 
expenditures as defined by the OECD in its Classification of the Functions of the 
Government (COFOG).
3
 It classifies government expenditure data from the System of 
National Accounts by the purpose for which the funds are used, also called functional 
decomposition. The first-level of this classification splits public expenditures into ten 
components: (i) general public services; (ii) defence; (iii) public order and safety; (iv) 
                                                             
2 The countries (data availability) considered in this study are: Austria (1995-2012), Belgium (1990-2012), 
Denmark (1990-2012), Finland (1990-2012), France (1995-2012), Germany (1991-2012), Greece 
(1990-2012), Ireland (1990-2012), Italy (1990-2012), Luxembourg (1990-2012), Netherlands (1995-2012), 
Portugal (1990-2012), Spain (1995-2012), Sweden (1995-2012), United Kingdom (1990-2012). 
3 See OECD (2009, 2011, 2013, 2015), Government at a Glance. 
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economic affairs; (v) environmental protection; (vi) housing and community amenities; 
(vii) health; (viii) recreation, culture and religion; (ix) education; (x) social protection. The 
second-level disaggregates each first-level group into up to nine sub-components. The total 
general government expenditures (TotExpd) and each of the ten components (and respective 
sub-components) are used as dependent variables in this analysis.
4
 
Fiscal consolidation episodes were identified using the work of Devries et al. (2011) 
for the period 1990-2009 and updated from Kataryniuk and Vallés (2015) for the years 
2010-2012. Both authors use a narrative approach to identify those consolidations. For the 
missing data for Greece and Luxembourg, we are consistent with the narrative approach 
and combine the information provided by Kataryniuk and Vallés (2015), Dellepiane and 
Hardiman (2015) and OECD (2011) country notes on Restoring Public Finances to obtain 
the respective consolidation periods, kind and size. Hence, our fiscal consolidation variable 
(Consolidation) is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 in the years in which a fiscal 
consolidation is being implemented (0, otherwise). 
As argued by Devries et al. (2011), the standard statistical approach which focuses 
on variation in the cyclically adjusted primary budget balance (CAPB) may lead to biased 
results for two important reasons. First, the CAPB may suffer from measurement error that 
is potentially correlated with economic developments. Second, it omits periods during 
which fiscal consolidation programs are followed by adverse shocks and offsetting 
discretionary measures. For these reasons, we follow the narrative approach, which is based 
on the examination of accounts and records of what countries were intending to do at the 
time of publication of different institutional reports, to uncover policy actions that are 
motivated by deficit reduction. 
                                                             
4 See Table A.1 in Annex for the definition of each component and sub-component. 
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The reports considered by Devries et al. (2011) and Kataryniuk and Vallés (2015) in 
their narrative approach are, namely, the Budget Reports, Budget Speeches, the 
Convergence and Stability Programs submitted to the European Commission, the IMF 
Recent Economic Developments reports, the IMF Staff Reports or the OECD Economic 
Surveys, the national central bank reports, as well as sources at the country level such as the 
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) reports and the Economic Report of the President in 
the case of the US, the Journal Officiel de la Republique Française for France, and the press 
releases and publications of the Ministry of Finance, among others. Those documents 
provide evidence of not only what policymakers believed at the time that decisions were 
taken, but also the budgetary impact of such measures. 
The respective fiscal actions represent a response to past decisions and economic 
conditions and not to future prospects. Hence, it is unlikely that they are correlated with the 
economic environment in the short-term. Similarly, in order to avoid selection bias, fiscal 
consolidations are recorded even if they are followed by an adverse shock and an offsetting 
countercyclical discretionary stimulus. The budgetary effect of fiscal consolidation is 
recorded in the year in which it comes into effect. Hence, if the measures were announced 
but not implemented, they are not included in the database. Moreover, to assess whether 
measures were implemented and/or to investigate the end of a fiscal consolidation program, 
the subsequent editions of the historical documents are also analysed. 
The kind and size of fiscal consolidations are two related variables that can also 
influence the behaviour of the components of government spending. In particular, 
spending-driven consolidations (SpendConsol) might have a stronger impact on them than 
tax-driven consolidations (TaxConsol).
5
 These dummies will be used separately in the 
specifications to collect the respective effects. Regarding the size, we consider that the 
                                                             
5 See, among others, Molnár (2012), Heylen et al. (2013), Agnello et al. (2013) and the references therein. 
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higher the fiscal consolidation package is, as percentage of GDP (SizeConsol), the more 
intense the impact on the components will be.
6
 A similar analysis will be provided for the 
size of spending-driven (SizeSpendConsol) and tax driven (SizeTaxConsol) consolidations. 
As longer consolidations might affect the fiscal components differently, we also estimate 
the effect of the duration of fiscal consolidations (DurConsol). 
Moreover, in some additional specifications we account for the evolution of public 
debt (Debt), government budget surplus (GBS) and the cyclically adjusted budget surplus 
(AdjGBS), as unbalances in those fiscal variables are the ultimate reason for the 
implementation of fiscal consolidation packages. The data for these fiscal variables come 
from the Comparative Political Data Set I. 
The data for the other economic and political variables also comes from the 
Comparative Political Data Set I. To control for the role of economic environment – well 
documented in the literature review – we use the growth rate of real GDP (RealGDPgr); the 
long-term interest rate on government bonds (InterestRate) accounts for the pressure on the 
spending components due to an increase in the burden of the public debt. 
Following Alesina et al. (1997) and the recent studies by Castro and Martins (2016a, 
b), two political variables were considered to control for opportunistic and partisan effects: 
a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 in the year of national legislative elections, and 
0 otherwise (Election); and a dummy variable that takes de value of 1 when there is 
hegemony or dominance of left-wing parties in the cabinet, and 0 otherwise (LeftGov).
7
  
Finally, to control for the impact of the structure of the population (demographic 
issues) on public spending, two additional variables are considered: the percentage of the 
                                                             
6 In line with the works of Giavazzi and Pagano (1996), von Hagen and Strauch (2001), Molnár (2012) and 
Agnello et al. (2013), among others. 
7
 LeftGov was computed from the gov_party variable in the CPDS database (it is equal to 1 when gov_party is 
equal to 4 and 5, i.e. when there is dominance or hegemony of left-wing parties). 
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population between 0 and 14 years of age (Young); and the percentage of the population 
with 65 or more years of age (Elderly). A complete description of the variables and some 
descriptive statistics can be found in Tables A.1 and A.2 in Annex.
8
 
We employ a fixed-effects estimator to test the following specification: 
 
ExpdCit = β0+β1Consolidationit + β2RealGDPgrit-1 + β3InterestRateit +  
β4Electionit + β5LeftGovit + β6Youngit + β7Elderlyit + δTrendit + vi + eit  (1) 
 
where i=1,…,15, t=1990,…,2012. ExpdCit represents the real growth rate of the respective 
components (or sub-component) of government expenditures. The coefficient on 
Consolidation (β1) captures the impact of a fiscal consolidation on each kind of government 
spending; β2 to β7 measure the effect of the economic, political and demographic 
controllers. A time-trend is also included in the specification to account for the evolution of 
spending over time and the technological progress. Regarding the last components, νi is the 
individual effect of each country i, and eit is the error term. Given the presence of individual 
effects νi, the model can be estimated assuming those effects as fixed or random. Hausman 
tests support the fixed-effects estimator. 
 
4. Empirical results 
The results from the estimation of the impact of fiscal consolidations on the 
components of public expenditures are presented in Table 1. As the fiscal variables and 
                                                             
8  See also Table A.3, where we report the average growth rates of the components of government 
expenditures during consolidations periods and normal times. Total public spending and its components grow 
less, on average, when a fiscal consolidation takes place. The exceptions are PubServ and EconAff; Defence, 
Housing and Education present even negative growth rates during consolidations. In the empirical analysis 
provided next we test the statistical significance of this evidence. 
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some of the controllers are not stationary in levels, we use the respective growth rates.
9
 We 
start by looking at the impact of fiscal consolidations at the aggregated level of public 
spending, i.e. in the growth rate of total general government expenditures. 
 
[Insert Table 1 around here] 
 
As expected, the results presented in column (1) show that fiscal consolidations 
(Consolidation) have a significant negative impact on total public spending: during periods 
of fiscal consolidations the growth rate of total public expenditure is, on average, about two 
percentage points lower than in the other periods. In fact, fiscal consolidations are meant to 
reduce public spending, so this is not a surprising result. However, what we intend to 
analyse is what happens inside public spending, at the level of its components. 
We consider the ten functional components of government expenditures (as defined 
by the OECD) to uncover the respective effects. The results are presented in columns 
(2)-(11) in Table 1 and clearly indicate that spending in most of the components is cut 
during fiscal consolidations. The ones in which the cuts are statistically more significant are 
defence, public order, environment, housing, health, education and social protection. 
Changes in spending on economic affairs and recreation have not proved to be as 
significant as the others. 
However, the growth rate of spending in public services increases during fiscal 
consolidations. As this category includes public debt transactions, it is possible that 
increased spending in this sub-category may be happening during consolidations due to the 
likely rise in interest payments and outlays for underwriting and floating government loans 
                                                             
9 See Im, Pesaran and Shin panel unit root tests in Table A.4 in Annex. The interest rate is in first differences. 
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(items inside public debt transactions). This is an issue that we will explore in greater depth 
below when we look at the items inside of the functional components of public spending. 
When we look at the impact of the controllers, a better economic environment – i.e. 
an increase in real GDP growth rate (RealGDP_gr) – has a positive and significant impact 
on total spending and on most of its components. This means that their behaviour is 
pro-cyclical and in line with Alesina et al. (2008) findings for public spending. That 
behaviour is also observed in what concerns to the interest rate effect: when interest rates 
(InterestRate) rise, governments are forced to reduce spending (at aggregated and 
disaggregated levels) as the cost of financing public expenditures increases. This is more 
evident in components such defence, public order and social protection. 
Regarding the political variables, we find that governments tend to increase total 
public expenditures during election years (Election). These results are in line with the 
findings of other studies focusing on the EU (Mink and de Haan, 2006; and Efthyvoulou, 
2012). The functional components in which expenditures are increased during elections are 
public services, public order, health, education and social protection. These are the items in 
which governments tend to spend more in proportion to the total expenditure and with 
which they can send a stronger sign of competence to the electorate. Moreover, these 
results confirm Castro and Martins‟ (2016b) conclusions that the bigger and more „visible‟ 
categories of public expenditure are the ones that are especially targeted by opportunistic 
governments during elections. Additionally, we also observe that despite government 
orientation (LeftGov) has no impact on total spending, left-wing governments are indeed 
more prone to increase spending on the following expenditure components: defence, public 
order and education. 
The structure of the population (Young, Elderly) does not seem to matter much for 
the evolution of public spending or its components in this group of 15 EU countries. This 
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might be the case because these countries share a common demographic structure and other 
political and economic reasons/motives may play a more important role in the fluctuations 
of public spending components. 
Finally, total government expenditures and most of its components exhibit a 
decreasing trend, which means that the respective growth rates have decreased over time. 
This tendency is considerable, in particular, for spending on environment, recreation and 
education. 
The issue of endogeneity is also taken into account in our analysis. In Table A.5 in 
Annex are reported the results from an IV estimator, where fixed effects are controlled for. 
Consolidation, RealGRPgr and InterestRate are assumed to be endogenous and are 
instrumented with their first lags, a lag of inflation and a lag of the cyclically adjusted 
government budget surplus. The results are very similar, in particular in what concerns to 
the effect of fiscal consolidations on the components of public spending: the ones in which 
we observe a significant impact are the same that we found in the regressions reported in 
Table 1. In fact, the Durbin-Wu-Hausman endogeneity test does not reject the null 
hypothesis that the differences in the coefficients are not systematic. We tried with other 
instruments, but the results was the same, so endogeneity does not seem to be an issue and 
we proceed using the fixed effects estimator. 
Another aspect that worth to explore is whether and how the kind, size and duration 
of a fiscal consolidation affect each functional component of public expenditures. The 
respective results are reported in Table 2, but only for the consolidation variables. The 
controllers are the same that were used in the regressions shown in Table 1 but they are not 
reported here for the sack of parsimoniousness of the analysis and to save space. The results 
reported for Consolidation are replicated from Table 1. 
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[Insert Table 2 around here] 
 
Spending-driven consolidations (SpendConsol) have a negative and significant 
impact on total expenditures and on most of its components. As these consolidations aim at 
reducing spending, this result is in line with our expectations and the empirical studies on 
the composition of fiscal consolidations (Molnár, 2012; Heylen et al., 2013; Agnello et al., 
2013, among others). For the same reasons, we expected that tax-driven consolidation 
(TaxConsol) will not affect the spending components significantly. In fact, only housing 
expenditures are significantly decreased during tax-driven consolidations. However, when 
we look at the effect of the fiscal consolidation size, things change substantially. The size 
matters not only for total spending and spending-driven consolidations, but also for 
tax-driven consolidations. The higher the size of the fiscal consolidation package (total, 
spending- or tax-driven) in percentage of GDP is, the more intense the respective impact on 
both total spending and on the respective components will be. Only the growth rate of 
public services is not significantly affected. This might, once again, have to do with the 
public debt transactions mentioned above. But while a tax-driven consolidation might not 
have a significant impact on government expenditure components, its size ends up affecting 
spending in the same direction as spending-driven fiscal consolidations. 
The results with the duration of consolidations (DurConsol) are slightly weaker, but 
they are in line with the previous ones as they show that longer consolidations end up being 
detrimental to spending on public order, housing health, education and social protection 
(besides total spending). 
As the main reason for countries to implement austerity measures is related to 
increasing debts and deficits, we also replace the consolidation variables by these fiscal 
variables to show the consistency and robustness of our results. We start by considering the 
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lag of the change in public debt (Debt) as percentage of GDP (it is its first-difference that 
is stationary; see Table A.4 in Annex), then the fiscal variable is replaced in the model by 
lag of the government budget surplus (GBS) as percentage of GDP. To account for the 
business cycle, we also use the lag of the cyclically adjusted budget surplus (AdjGBS). The 
results are consistent with the ones obtained with the consolidation variables, confirming 
our conclusions: total spending and spending in most of its components are significantly cut 
when public debt and deficit increase; the exception is, once again, public services.
10
 
To understand the increase in the growth rate of spending in public services during 
fiscal consolidations and to check how those consolidations affect each particular item 
inside the ten components of public expenditures, we collect data on the sub-components of 
each component of public expenditures. Those data are available from the Eurostat 
database. Even though they present a shorter time span (1995-2012) than the previous data 
and also some missing data for a few countries/components, we ended up with reasonably 
good datasets for each sub-component. This allows us to proceed with a more fine-tuned 
empirical analysis. 
The results are presented in Tables 3 and 4. The structure of the model used in these 
estimations remains identical to the analysis for the first-level components, in the sense that 
each equation is related to the respective sub-component and estimated using the 
fixed-effects estimator over the same set of independent variables. We report the 
coefficients for all variables, except for the time-trend. For the sack of parsimoniousness of 
the analysis, we will only focus on the results for Consolidation. 
 
                                                             
10 We also estimated some specifications where we replaced some controllers by other proxies like output 
gap, growth rate of real GDP per capita, and population growth. In other case, time dummies were used 
instead of the time trend. However, the conclusions of this study remain unaffected. Additionally, interaction 
effects between Consolidation, Election and LeftGov were also analysed, but no significant effects were 
found. These sensitivity analyses are not reported here to save space, but they are available upon request. 
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[Insert Table 3 around here] 
[Insert Table 4 around here] 
 
A primary interest regarding these results is to check the origin of the increase in 
public services spending during fiscal consolidations. The results show that the source of 
that increase might be the public debt transactions. This is the only item for which the 
coefficient on Consolidation is positive and statistically significant. When we look at the 
expenditures lodged inside this sub-item (see Eurostat, 2011), we can conjecture that the 
increased spending in this sub-category might be due to the likely rise in interest payments 
and outlays for underwriting and floating government loans. As countries also intend to 
reduce public debt during fiscal consolidations, they can be using the reduction in the other 
components to finance the reduction of public debt (via the increase in public debt 
transactions), which ends up increasing spending in the public services component. 
Regarding the other items, we only find a significant decrease in executive affairs and 
general services research and development (R&D) expenditures, which ends up being 
unable to mitigate the strong positive effect of public debt transactions. 
Military defence and foreign military aid are the items inside defence targeted more 
intensively during fiscal consolidations. We also observe significant cuts in public order 
items like police, fire and courts, but the spending with prisons is not significantly affected. 
Despite the expenditure on economic affairs does not change significantly, when we dig 
deeper inside this component, some of its items are indeed (significantly) negatively 
affected during fiscal consolidations: public spending on agriculture, transports and R&D. 
A different picture is obtained when we look inside spending in environmental protection: 
the statistical significance regarding their items is weak (see Table 3), in comparison with 
the overall effect of fiscal consolidations on this component identified in Table 1. 
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Changes in spending on housing amenities due to fiscal consolidations are mainly 
driven by housing developments, while health expenditures tend to be lower due to 
decreases of spending in hospital services, public health services, and R&D. Spending cuts 
in recreation seem to be driven by cuts in one item: sport activities. A different scenario is 
found when we look at what happens inside education and social protection expenditures: 
almost all items are negatively affected during processes of fiscal consolidations. One 
important outcome of these disaggregated results is that they reinforce the idea that fiscal 
consolidations are harmful for important social (public) expenditures. 
However, none of the previous analyses tells anything about how consolidations 
change the share of each component relatively to total expenditure or relatively to the other 
components. Thus, next we test the cross-effects between the expenditure components. We 
replaced the dependent variable in our econometric specification by the ratio of each 
component relatively to the others (and to total expenditures). This means that now we are 
measuring the relative effects between the components when the covariates change. The 
results are presented in Table 5, but only for the coefficient on Consolidation.
11
 
 
[Insert Table 5 around here] 
 
Each line presents the consolidation effect for the ratio of each component to each 
of the other components that are indicated in each column. The results clearly show that 
expenditures in public services increase significantly during periods of fiscal consolidations 
relatively to almost all the other components of public expenditures, and inclusive 
                                                             
11 Each regression was estimated using a fixed-effects estimator and the same covariates considered in our 
baseline model, but the estimates on their coefficients are not reported here to save space; however, they are 
available upon request. 
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relatively to total expenditures.
12
 Once again, the increase in public debt transactions 
during those periods might be driving these results. 
As already mentioned, countries intending to reduce public debt during fiscal 
consolidations can be using the spending cuts in the other components to finance the 
reduction of public debt via the increase in public debt transactions, which ends up 
increasing spending in public services relatively to the other components. 
Spending in economic affairs is another component that rises significantly relatively 
to environment, health, recreation and education; in the other cases, the effect is not 
relevant. This increase during fiscal consolidations might be due to the intensification of 
general affairs related to the efforts needed to control public deficit and debt. 
Defence and public order are significantly cut relatively to total expenditures during 
fiscal consolidation processes, but when compared with the other components, besides 
public services, spending on defence only decreases significantly relatively to social 
protection; public order also decreases relatively to social protection, education and health. 
In fact, public order seems to be one of the components that suffers the most during fiscal 
consolidations. Health and education decrease relatively to total expenditures and social 
protection. Finally, spending on environmental issues and housing amenities do not change 
significantly relatively to either total expenditures or the other components. 
In sum, public services is the component that increases more significantly during 
fiscal consolidations, relatively to the other components and to total spending. The other 
components behave differently between them, but relatively to total spending we find that 
spending in defence, public order, health, and education is significantly cut during periods 
of fiscal consolidations. Thus, contrary to what is argued by Sanz (2011) – that fiscal 
adjustments protect functions that have both a social and productive character, such as 
                                                             
12 The exceptions are housing, recreation and social protection (positive coefficients, but insignificant). 
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education and health spending – our findings show that citizens‟ safety, health assistance, 
and investment in human capital are harmed when governments decide to stabilize public 
accounts, which can undermine the living standards and human development of a country.
13
 
As a final and complementary exercise, we account for the heterogeneity. Since in 
the sample of countries used in this analysis we have a group known for unbalances in (or 
for being more “relaxed” with) their public accounts – Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and 
Spain, also known as PIIGS – we will split the analysis in two groups: PIIGS versus the 
other countries. The PIIGS have faced economic difficulties, high levels of public deficits 
and debts that forced them to implement severe fiscal packages. Thus the aim of this 
analysis is to find whether they have behaved differently from the others or not. The results 
from this separate analysis are presented in Table 6. We use the same specifications as in 
Table 1, however, in this case, at the top of the table are reported the results for the PIIGS 
and at the bottom the results for the other ten countries.
14
 
 
[Insert Table 6 around here] 
 
                                                             
13
 Similar conclusions are obtained when regressions with per capita values for total public expenditure and 
respective functional components are considered. In Table A.6 in Annex, we report the respective results with 
per capita values. These results are obtained from a dynamic model, as in this case we have to control for the 
observed persistency in the dependent variables (not always stationary). The results show that public services 
expenditure per capita also increases during fiscal consolidations while spending per capita on citizens‟ 
safety, health assistance, investment in human capital decrease significantly. Moreover, we also corroborate 
the results for the growth rates as we observe additional decreases in environment, housing, recreation and 
social protection spending per capita. 
14 We also estimated the model considering only EMU countries and excluding one country at a time from the 
sample, but the conclusions remained identical to the ones we got with the analysis reported in Table 1. As no 
significant new findings were obtained from those experiments, the respective results are not reported here to 
save space but they are available upon request. 
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The evidence is clear in showing that fiscal consolidations have a more intense and 
significant impact in the PIIGS than in the other countries. Consolidations measures reduce 
spending in total expenditures and in almost all its components (except public services and 
defence). The economic environment also seems to play a more important role in that 
specific group of countries. In general, the other results do not change much relatively to 
the ones we obtained with the whole sample. 
These findings might mean that to offset the fiscal unbalances in the PIIGS, fiscal 
consolidations ended up being even more harmful there. This can have an important 
negative impact on the well-being of their most vulnerable citizens and undermine not only 
their economic growth, but also jeopardize their economic, social and human development. 
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper analyses the impact of fiscal consolidations on the functional 
components and sub-components of public expenditures using data for 15 EU countries 
over the period 1990-2012. The empirical analysis shows that government spending slows 
down during periods of fiscal consolidations. But, more importantly, our results unveil that 
the components in which those decreases are more significant are defence, public order, 
environment, housing, health, education and social protection, especially if they are 
spending-driven and the higher their size is. This evidence is even stronger in a particular 
group of countries, known in the literature as PIIGS. 
Nevertheless, spending in public services has consistently proved to increase during 
fiscal consolidations. Digging deeper in the data, we find that the cause for that increase is 
the public debt transactions: when we look at the expenditures lodged inside this item, we 
realise that the boost in this item can be due to the likely rise in interest payments and 
outlays for underwriting and floating government loans. As countries also intend to reduce 
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public debt during fiscal consolidations, they can use the cuts in the other components to 
finance the reduction of public debt (via the increase in public debt transactions), which 
ends up increasing spending in the public services component. 
We also look at the behaviour of the items inside each of the other components and 
conclude that one important outcome of that very disaggregated analysis is that they 
reinforce the idea that fiscal consolidations end up being very harmful for important social 
public expenditures like health, education and social protection. 
Additionally, we test the cross-effects between the expenditure components and 
relatively to total expenditure. Expenditures in public services increase significantly during 
fiscal consolidations relatively to the other components of public expenditures, and 
inclusive relatively to total expenditures. The increase in public debt transactions during 
those periods might be driving these results. The other components behave differently 
between them, but relatively to total spending we find that spending in defence, public 
order, health, and education is significantly cut during periods of fiscal consolidations. 
Overall, the findings of this paper call the attention to the fact that citizens‟ safety, 
health assistance, and investment in human capital can be harmed when governments 
decide to stabilize public accounts. This behaviour can undermine the living standards, 
boost income inequalities, affect social and political stability, and put human development 
in danger. Governments should take this information into account when designing 
consolidation packages, as a way of promoting a fair distribution of the consolidation 
efforts by all economic agents. Otherwise, the more vulnerable citizens will suffer the most. 
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Tables 
 
 
Table 1. The impact of fiscal consolidations on the components of government expenditure 
Dep. Vars.: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Growth rate of TotExpd PubServ Defence PubOrder EconAff Environm Housing Health Recreat Educ SocProtect 
            
Consolidation -1.946** 2.092* -2.221** -2.914** -0.083 -3.932** -9.776** -3.438*** -2.618* -2.602*** -1.831*** 
 (0.687) (1.040) (1.112) (1.146) (5.352) (1.786) (3.940) (0.906) (1.388) (0.865) (0.500) 
RealGDPgr 0.199** 0.065 0.009 0.590*** -0.924 0.987*** 1.043** 0.686*** 0.757*** 0.420*** -0.034 
 (0.101) (0.179) (0.483) (0.133) (1.053) (0.216) (0.428) (0.134) (0.211) (0.125) (0.076) 
InterestRate -0.458* 0.413 -1.671** -0.919* -0.652 -0.039 -1.688 -0.674 -0.606 -0.739 -0.438** 
 (0.269) (0.399) (0.757) (0.456) (1.249) (0.608) (1.031) (0.504) (0.485) (0.434) (0.217) 
Election 1.782** 3.016*** 1.354 1.637** -10.605 1.691 1.806 2.616*** 1.910 1.579* 1.629*** 
 (0.679) (0.748) (1.437) (0.711) (9.979) (1.531) (1.772) (0.635) (1.166) (0.845) (0.428) 
LeftGov 0.428 -1.181 3.972** 2.216* -8.025 1.954 1.481 0.658 0.283 2.049** -0.419 
 (0.778) (1.065) (1.527) (1.252) (8.027) (1.898) (1.973) (0.559) (1.483) (0.956) (0.723) 
Young -0.515 -0.586 0.191 0.049 -2.193 -2.375** -1.773 0.462 -1.218* 0.053 -0.554 
 (0.535) (0.446) (0.556) (0.524) (1.494) (1.178) (1.088) (0.572) (0.740) (0.487) (0.479) 
Elderly -0.143 0.058 -0.260 0.262 -4.036** 0.361 0.891 0.044 -0.045 0.305 -0.139 
 (0.454) (0.482) (0.902) (0.517) (1.655) (1.053) (2.309) (0.585) (0.423) (0.481) (0.560) 
Trend -0.046 0.013 0.153 -0.075 0.297 -0.664** -0.282 0.001 -0.299** -0.114** -0.105 
 (0.077) (0.094) (0.122) (0.090) (0.274) (0.272) (0.296) (0.064) (0.129) (0.053) (0.085) 
            
            
#Observations 295 295 295 295 295 295 295 295 295 295 295 
#Countries 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
R-squared 0.085 0.098 0.065 0.156 0.021 0.150 0.050 0.251 0.142 0.179 0.092 
Hausman test 37.04 23.21 28.78 15.82 23.15 82.24 38.72 16.36 99.58 33.43 56.95 
 [0.000] [0.003] [0.000] [0.045] [0.003] [0.000] [0.000] [0.038] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
            
Notes: See Tables A.1 and A2 in Annex. Robust standard errors are in parentheses; significance level at which the null 
hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%; and *, 10%. The growth rate of the real values of each expenditure component is 
used as the respective dependent variable in each equation. RealGDPgr is lagged one period to avoid simultaneity 
problems and to account for the usual delay in the release of data for output. The InterestRate is in first differences as it is 
not stationary in levels (see Table A.4 in Annex). The results from the Hausman test-statistic (random versus fixed effects) 
are reported at the bottom of the table (the respective p-values in square brackets). 
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Table 2. Kind and size of the fiscal consolidations 
Dep. Vars.: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Growth rate of TotExpd PubServ Defence PubOrder EconAff Environm Housing Health Recreat Educ SocProtect 
            
Consolidation -1.946** 2.092* -2.221** -2.914** -0.083 -3.932** -9.776** -3.438*** -2.618* -2.602*** -1.831*** 
 (0.687) (1.040) (1.112) (1.146) (5.352) (1.786) (3.940) (0.906) (1.388) (0.865) (0.500) 
            
SpendConsol -2.687*** 1.112 -1.507 -3.380*** -8.031* -4.768** -9.373** -3.626*** -3.277** -2.922*** -2.303*** 
 (0.484) (1.057) (1.841) (1.080) (4.153) (2.094) (3.526) (0.642) (1.135) (0.606) (0.450) 
            
TaxConsol 0.389 2.324 -1.720 -2.800 13.015 0.350 -7.271** -1.191 0.089 -0.524 0.030 
 (1.108) (1.665) (1.234) (1.147) (9.382) (1.775) (3.062) (1.176) (1.718) (0.825) (0.764) 
            
SizeConsol -1.962*** 0.062 -3.014*** -2.209*** -4.461** -3.081*** -6.015*** -2.371*** -2.760*** -2.380*** -1.365*** 
 (0.413) (0.584) (0.559) (0.358) (2.115) (0.632) (1.652) (0.408) (0.563) (0.337) (0.206) 
            
SizeSpendConsol -2.971*** 0.341 -3.500*** -3.222*** -7.790** -4.341*** -7.918** -3.434*** -3.945*** -3.347*** -2.252*** 
 (0.937) (0.934) (1.119) (0.841) (3.706) (1.401) (3.207) (0.692) (1.145) (0.738) (0.378) 
            
DurConsol -0.369** 0.422 -0.131 -0.725** 0.853 -0.496* -2.039** -0.733** -0.083 -0.473** -0.352*** 
 (0.188) (0.328) (0.122) (0.321) (1.918) (0.302) (0.980) (0.352) (0.124) (0.199) (0.122) 
            
Debt -0.208** 0.212* -0.753** 0.041 -0.280 -0.224 -0.899** -0.253** -0.147** -0.245*** -0.182** 
 (0.087) (0.103) (0.317) (0.186) (0.481) (0.152) (0.407) (0.125) (0.072) (0.050) (0.066) 
            
GBS 0.535** -0.513** 0.467* 0.383*** -1.079 0.351** 1.688*** 0.390*** 0.509*** 0.301*** 0.258*** 
 (0.203) (0.248) (0.248) (0.122) (2.589) (0.171) (0.510) (0.101) (0.166) (0.102) (0.086) 
            
AdjGBS 0.505** -0.508** 0.523** 0.394*** -1.615 0.423** 1.729*** 0.344*** 0.596*** 0.275** 0.229** 
 (0.233) (0.247) (0.229) (0.132) (3.257) (0.180) (0.533) (0.123) (0.116) (0.118) (0.106) 
            
            
#Observations 295 295 295 295 295 295 295 295 295 295 295 
#Countries 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
            
Notes: See Table 1 and Tables A.1 and A.2 in Annex. Robust standard errors are in parentheses; significance level at 
which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%; and *, 10%. The results reported for Consolidation are replicated 
from Table 1. The variables Debt, GBS and AdjGBS are lagged one period. The controllers are the same that were used 
in the regressions shown in Table 1 but they are not reported here for the sack of parsimoniousness of the analysis and to 
save space. 
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Table 3. Sub-components analysis (part I) 
 1. Public Services 2. Defence 3. Public Order 
Dep.Vars.: (1.1) (1.2) (1.3) (1.4) (1.5) (1.6) (1.7) (2.1) (2.2) (2.3) (2.4) (2.5) (3.1) (3.2) (3.3) (3.4) (3.5) 
Growth rate ExecAff ForAid GServ BasicRD GServRD OthServ DebtTrs MilDef CivDef FMilAid DefRD OthDef Police Fire Courts Prisons OthPO 
                  
Consolidation -2.955** -5.505 -1.037 25.428 -17.414** 2.314 5.706** -4.437*** -12.026 -13.574** 11.420 -29.785** -4.604*** -4.893** -3.666** -3.331 -6.517 
 (1.304) (8.500) (2.194) (33.824) (7.466) (6.463) (1.976) (1.401) (9.860) (5.999) (11.617) (13.059) (1.061) (1.650) (1.530) (1.947) (6.399) 
RealGDPgr -0.198 1.046 0.159 -50.771 -0.769 2.681** -0.041 -0.399 -2.542 0.814 -2.102 7.777 0.137 0.155 0.507** 0.339 0.361 
 (0.421) (0.881) (0.630) (52.738) (1.280) (1.174) (0.594) (0.801) (2.706) (1.551) (2.792) (5.247) (0.156) (0.213) (0.236) (0.473) (1.188) 
InterestRate -2.492** -0.066 0.409 107.072 -3.622 -2.197 2.091 -2.013* -1.762 1.747 3.174 -14.119 0.033 -2.581 -1.254 -0.933 7.031 
 (0.851) (1.660) (2.765) (70.034) (2.893) (3.503) (1.931) (0.949) (9.261) (2.128) (5.336) (10.799) (0.344) (1.541) (0.794) (0.884) (5.026) 
Election 4.723** 3.112 3.707 -106.442 -3.761 11.837 1.902 0.524 -6.883 -0.227 0.103 33.283 2.764 1.072 0.433 -0.529 -6.600 
 (1.682) (4.473) (2.390) (107.640) (5.417) (9.988) (1.571) (1.991) (22.103) (6.962) (9.592) (33.805) (1.714) (1.373) (1.037) (2.102) (7.353) 
LeftGov -0.764 6.056 1.036 232.043 6.602 10.548 -1.287 0.539 -2.534 -11.614 -15.581 5.162 0.060 1.768 -1.015 -0.006 -2.680 
 (2.274) (5.608) (3.326) (250.204) (7.677) (7.658) (2.250) (2.820) (11.978) (7.101) (13.023) (12.534) (1.222) (2.933) (1.532) (2.313) (4.528) 
Young 0.402 -0.826 4.520 11.090 -3.071 6.325 -0.702 0.916 14.627 7.509 -21.974 8.419 1.622 2.247 1.525 1.622 7.028 
 (0.830) (5.957) (3.797) (44.590) (5.868) (8.427) (2.184) (1.192) (10.687) (4.615) (12.894) (10.639) (1.497) (1.719) (1.430) (1.777) (5.824) 
Elderly 2.543 -1.836 0.416 247.726 1.693 4.439 -4.893*** -0.339 -9.600 -9.371 -22.796 -25.818 2.392 -1.259 -0.316 0.326 14.498* 
 (1.623) (4.873) (1.809) (199.939) (5.347) (10.504) (1.628) (1.518) (10.838) (7.358) (15.525) (21.285) (1.550) (1.378) (1.458) (1.173) (7.091) 
                  
                  
#Observations 212 206 212 187 182 204 212 212 140 184 168 169 212 212 212 212 207 
#Countries 15 14 15 13 13 14 15 15 11 13 12 12 15 15 15 15 15 
R-squared 0.122 0.041 0.028 0.056 0.081 0.022 0.210 0.062 0.016 0.073 0.042 0.046 0.159 0.122 0.116 0.074 0.047 
                  
 4. Economic Affairs 5. Environmental Protection   
Dep.Vars.: (4.1) (4.2) (4.3) (4.4) (4.5) (4.6) (4.7) (4.8) (4.9) (5.1) (5.2) (5.3) (5.4) (5.5) (5.6)   
Growth rate GenAff Agric Energy Constr Transp Communic OthInd EAffRD OthEAff Waste WastWater Pollut Protect EnvirRD OthEnvir   
                  
Consolidation 6.595 -10.123** -2.235 -7.057 -9.589*** -46.467* -3.200 -9.030*** -39.572 -10.557* -9.732 180.620 -11.408* -8.710 -2.101   
 (15.140) (4.078) (11.325) (6.063) (2.764) (26.287) (3.589) (2.143) (24.924) (5.672) (14.966) (165.717) (6.039) (9.131) (2.341)   
RealGDPgr -9.091 1.089** 3.932* 4.567* 0.343 14.797 2.361* -1.039 2.945* 0.351 0.675 3.169 0.244 -0.573 -0.122   
 (7.670) (0.396) (1.821) (2.232) (0.575) (13.693) (1.243) (0.638) (1.604) (0.890) (2.965) (12.464) (1.482) (2.089) (0.675)   
InterestRate 28.561 -6.201 -1.616 -8.177* -2.552** 19.697 -5.243 1.754 13.303 -2.042* 5.236 258.269 -0.657 6.156 -1.763   
 (18.328) (5.763) (9.488) (4.235) (0.932) (22.480) (3.393) (0.995) (16.342) (0.960) (3.909) (195.082) (2.429) (4.554) (1.575)   
Election -8.344 12.642 -15.495 10.092 5.004 85.610 -4.459 -5.674 -19.535 0.403 -20.659 26.995 -10.461 -14.848 -3.815   
 (17.175) (9.091) (17.014) (9.700) (5.295) (125.526) (3.817) (3.232) (11.724) (3.660) (18.210) (30.091) (7.203) (16.019) (2.272)   
LeftGov -23.002 -10.754 21.540 -2.314 3.850 -142.275 -2.545 0.958 -16.215 4.783 -26.051 -98.671 3.188 4.525 5.754**   
 (29.646) (6.361) (14.590) (4.662) (4.107) (90.365) (5.708) (3.944) (16.422) (3.624) (24.068) (81.210) (5.190) (7.117) (2.487)   
Young 9.310 -3.785 -10.269 -6.681 -0.096 -83.735 -2.642 -0.565 34.727 4.238** 20.730 -31.945 7.437 -7.149* 6.006   
 (18.262) (2.171) (7.364) (5.267) (3.157) (120.543) (4.807) (3.138) (23.209) (1.786) (13.666) (42.267) (4.834) (3.972) (3.846)   
Elderly 4.217 -2.109 -1.874 -8.500 2.521 -10.752 0.265 7.395** 16.742 5.297 -4.276 91.033* 11.290 13.029 5.364   
 (19.602) (2.833) (14.786) (5.249) (3.319) (97.236) (6.087) (2.534) (14.486) (4.335) (7.798) (44.357) (7.609) (7.879) (3.910)   
                  
                  
#Observations 212 212 206 212 212 212 206 206 212 212 197 203 205 200 206   
#Countries 15 15 14 15 15 15 15 14 15 15 14 14 14 14 14   
R-squared 0.091 0.137 0.025 0.111 0.062 0.028 0.108 0.069 0.040 0.049 0.058 0.133 0.085 0.043 0.108   
Notes: See Table 1 and Table A.1 in Annex. Robust standard errors are in parentheses; significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%; and *, 10%. A time-trend is included in all regressions. Data for 
TransfGen, (in Public Services) and PubOrdRD (in Public Order) are missing for most of the countries; the lack of variability makes impossible to run the model for the respective equations. The growth rate of the real value of each 
expenditure sub-component is used as dependent variable in the respective equation. RealGDPgr is lagged one period and the InterestRate is in first differences.
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Table 4. Sub-components analysis (part II) 
 6. Housing Amenities 7. Health 8. Recreation 
Dep.Vars.: (6.1) (6.2) (6.3) (6.4) (6.5) (6.6) (7.1) (7.2) (7.3) (7.4) (7.5) (7.6) (8.1) (8.2) (8.3) (8.4) (8.5) (8.6) 
Growth rate HousDev ComDev WatSup StrLight HousRD OthHous MedProd OutPServ HospServ PubHlth HlthRD OthHlth Sports Culture Broadcast Religious RecrRD OthRecr 
                   
Consolidation -17.043** -11.739* 2.945 -2.029 -89.126 -18.643** -26.232 -13.763 -2.042*** -7.197*** -7.687*** 6.390 -5.164** -1.744 -28.648 -11.597 -23.752 -30.029 
 (6.067) (5.490) (6.921) (1.986) (58.719) (8.549) (20.728) (10.617) (0.593) (2.274) (1.898) (7.955) (1.996) (1.936) (33.850) (7.222) (21.194) (21.003) 
RealGDPgr 1.195 0.949 1.525** -0.323 -1.035 1.890 1.090 0.750 0.321*** -0.202 0.335 2.945 0.998 0.451 18.439 -1.520 -1.721 -0.099 
 (1.844) (1.006) (0.541) (1.246) (3.846) (1.976) (1.493) (0.699) (0.101) (0.545) (0.362) (1.857) (0.595) (0.292) (22.567) (2.210) (1.956) (2.823) 
InterestRate 3.676 -0.862 -3.790 0.997 -20.839 7.168 -1.128 -1.657* -1.293*** -0.355 0.766 -4.525 -1.316 -0.476 59.737 1.657 0.369 3.830 
 (3.196) (2.923) (2.787) (3.570) (15.960) (5.396) (1.780) (0.937) (0.406) (0.903) (0.787) (4.000) (0.799) (1.058) (38.461) (2.945) (2.365) (7.471) 
Election -16.986 -1.753 9.443* 1.527 -22.547 16.835 46.712 22.678 2.830** 6.280 7.595* -4.242 1.417 1.115 89.183 4.498 6.378 -14.037 
 (13.644) (6.892) (5.049) (5.621) (22.645) (16.911) (47.705) (22.658) (1.278) (3.685) (3.651) (5.938) (1.646) (1.737) (137.063) (4.647) (16.956) (14.239) 
LeftGov -11.545 -12.986 7.535 2.061 -74.249 7.014 20.240 11.756 -0.728 -7.152 6.026*** -5.452 2.763 2.356 -165.850 3.363 17.559 6.478 
 (12.079) (10.038) (4.313) (3.135) (44.346) (9.752) (19.985) (9.358) (0.987) (6.741) (1.513) (4.993) (2.523) (2.504) (107.399) (5.127) (17.602) (9.016) 
Young -24.104 -2.576 -9.611** -12.601 72.584 5.045 20.441 7.437 0.944 -0.355 3.072 13.347 -0.046 0.573 97.763 5.521 27.430 20.682 
 (23.770) (8.428) (3.581) (8.032) (56.592) (12.948) (24.877) (10.427) (1.210) (2.696) (2.520) (10.478) (1.688) (2.490) (68.927) (10.850) (35.408) (18.940) 
Elderly -10.010 5.061 1.487 -4.702 -25.869 11.691 31.071 13.138 0.009 0.788 7.921*** -2.349 2.693 1.304 -66.912 11.660 40.491 23.089 
 (5.972) (3.948) (3.332) (6.833) (21.113) (9.078) (33.682) (14.246) (0.663) (2.943) (2.069) (9.193) (1.611) (1.738) (64.960) (15.807) (36.583) (21.782) 
                   
                   
#Observations 211 189 195 148 138 168 212 212 195 206 212 212 212 212 212 208 169 183 
#Countries 15 13 14 11 10 13 15 15 14 14 15 15 15 15 15 15 12 13 
R-squared 0.032 0.046 0.032 0.027 0.044 0.040 0.038 0.038 0.225 0.074 0.154 0.038 0.258 0.089 0.036 0.026 0.066 0.037 
                   
 9. Education 10. Social Protection  
Dep.Vars.: (9.1) (9.2) (9.3) (9.4) (9.5) (9.6) (9.7) (9.8) (10.1) (10.2) (10.3) (10.4) (10.5) (10.6) (10.7) (10.8) (10.9)  
Growth rate Prim Second PosSec Tert Genr SubServ EducRD OthEduc SickDis Olders Survivors Family UnemPrt HousPrt SocExcl SocPrtRD OthSocP  
                   
Consolidation -2.818*** -2.377** -57.689 -4.435* -5.432* -7.674* -24.999* -8.256** -4.407*** -1.371** -4.233** -5.099*** -6.500** -23.995 -5.980* -1.953 -3.173  
 (0.729) (0.937) (41.062) (2.090) (2.727) (4.104) (12.401) (3.544) (0.944) (0.543) (1.804) (1.271) (2.239) (45.942) (2.983) (17.534) (2.498)  
RealGDPgr 0.027 0.084 1.392 0.250 -1.088 -0.253 0.403 -0.208 0.000 -0.039 -0.444 0.760*** -1.870*** 3.015 0.427 5.666** -0.149  
 (0.114) (0.157) (1.978) (0.220) (1.017) (0.585) (2.637) (0.653) (0.159) (0.122) (0.280) (0.240) (0.319) (14.813) (0.434) (2.448) (0.567)  
InterestRate -0.591* -1.488*** 52.984 -0.024 1.238 -0.522 -12.660 0.813 -0.599** -0.915*** -0.145 -1.784* -2.698** 102.750 -7.269* -3.828 -1.682  
 (0.316) (0.413) (62.364) (1.222) (1.576) (1.089) (7.299) (2.218) (0.258) (0.263) (0.588) (0.948) (0.953) (80.611) (3.837) (2.827) (1.591)  
Election 1.944** 1.257 82.280 1.290 -5.704 1.423 3.012 -3.016 2.722* 0.874** 1.302 1.797 0.709 9.100 -6.520 20.906 3.605  
 (0.729) (0.728) (105.392) (1.541) (6.966) (3.511) (10.776) (2.644) (1.425) (0.327) (1.462) (1.561) (1.542) (54.857) (4.858) (22.234) (4.479)  
LeftGov 0.935 2.352 -96.775 0.767 1.383 3.252 -8.273 0.239 1.004 -0.840 1.926 -0.958 4.421 -115.185 2.246 16.921 0.079  
 (0.823) (1.486) (100.164) (1.400) (10.240) (3.656) (6.745) (2.341) (2.134) (0.804) (2.552) (0.944) (2.959) (86.918) (3.413) (21.079) (3.169)  
Young -0.412 0.444 -75.596 2.408 -12.985 -3.272 12.328 -4.393 -0.228 1.327** 1.654 -2.715 -0.250 -12.477 0.227 -35.452 -0.945  
 (1.497) (1.068) (50.833) (2.017) (14.245) (1.946) (8.197) (2.829) (2.163) (0.604) (1.323) (2.120) (2.126) (23.463) (2.160) (25.226) (1.691)  
Elderly 0.625 0.643 35.982 -0.074 1.670 1.610 8.742* 1.131 0.959 0.376 1.435 -1.233 -1.004 104.983 -2.109 -44.776* 0.135  
 (1.036) (0.515) (42.722) (1.871) (4.208) (2.863) (4.697) (2.027) (1.032) (0.510) (1.137) (1.850) (2.040) (69.116) (2.367) (22.825) (1.863)  
                   
                   
#Observations 212 212 147 212 206 206 205 212 212 212 212 212 212 195 212 170 212  
#Countries 15 15 10 15 14 14 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 14 15 13 15  
R-squared 0.255 0.223 0.062 0.044 0.042 0.065 0.066 0.067 0.126 0.038 0.053 0.272 0.197 0.085 0.036 0.055 0.065  
Notes: See Table 1, Table 3 and Table A.1 in Annex. Robust standard errors are in parentheses; significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%; and *, 10%. A time-trend is included in all regressions. The 
growth rate of the real value of each expenditure sub-component is used as dependent variable in the respective equation. RealGDPgr is lagged one period and the InterestRate is in first differences. 
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Table 5. Fiscal consolidation effects in the ratios between the public expenditure components 
 PubServ Defence PubOrder EconAff Environm Housing Health Recreat Educ SocProtect TotExpd 
            
PubServ -- 48.270* 87.332* 22.715* 260.84** 81.108 12.379** 153.73 15.440** 0.734 0.661* 
 -- (25.874) (45.816) (16.102) (114.32) (98.111) (5.611) (97.817) (7.007) (1.323) (0.354) 
Defence  -- 10.444 5.108 35.334 -6.906 0.239 11.827 0.191 -0.727** -0.168** 
  -- (7.163) (6.444) (25.998) (13.699) (0.572) (10.967) (0.484) (0.308) (0.080) 
PubOrder   -- 3.547 8.527 -11.704 -1.405** -7.653 -1.373* -1.005** -0.261** 
   -- (5.408) (15.228) (13.893) (0.674) 7.017 (0.750) (0.386) (0.091) 
EconAff    -- 118.02* 35.720 5.442* 74.677* 8.172** 0.196 0.281 
    -- (64.403) (42.781) (3.013) (39.815) (3.795) (1.142) (0.263) 
Environm     -- -0.424 -0.307 3.064 -0.123 -0.223* -0.062 
     -- (7.164) (0.294) (2.935) (0.366) (0.118) (0.042) 
Housing      -- -0.171 1.369 -0.242 -0.412 -0.094 
      -- (1.241) (3.889) (1.165) (0.362) (0.125) 
Health       -- 15.526 0.046 -1.631** -0.374** 
       -- (20.929) (1.370) (0.769) (0.179) 
Recreat        -- -0.308 -0.377* -0.091 
        -- (0.651) (0.213) (0.068) 
Educ         -- -1.839*** -0.410** 
         -- (0.675) (0.168) 
SocProtect          -- 0.509 
          -- (0.359) 
TotExpd           -- 
           -- 
            
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses; significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 
1%; **, 5%; and *, 10%. Each line presents the consolidation effect (Consolidation coefficient, where each 
regression was estimated with the same covariates as in the baseline model – see Table 1) for the ratio of the 
respective component (in line) to each of the other components that are indicated in each column. The estimates for 
the coefficients on the other controllers are not reported here to save space, but they are available upon request. 
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Table 6. PIIGS versus the other EU countries 
Growth rate of TotExpd PubServ Defence PubOrder EconAff Environm Housing Health Recreat Educ SocProtect 
PIIGS (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
            
Consolidation -4.461*** -0.089 -1.878 -5.488* -6.777** -4.328*** -18.199** -6.866*** -8.203*** -5.816*** -3.819*** 
 (1.409) (1.534) (2.517) (3.188) (3.458) (1.089) (8.181) (1.098) (1.613) (1.419) (1.173) 
RealGDPgr 0.112 0.358 0.515 0.793* -1.610 1.598*** 0.699 0.782** 0.562* 0.478** 0.022 
 (0.157) (0.416) (0.417) (0.418) (3.175) (0.271) (1.623) (0.380) (0.328) (0.197) (0.254) 
InterestRate -0.529 0.345 -2.027** -1.187** -1.604 0.376 -2.208 -0.521 -0.186 -0.666 -0.561* 
 (0.624) (0.576) (0.878) (0.567) (1.966) (0.970) (2.148) (0.952) (0.837) (0.810) (0.288) 
Election 1.689 3.945*** 4.075* 0.873 -0.610 1.715 -0.663 2.947** 2.950 2.166* 2.018*** 
 (1.149) (1.223) (2.379) (1.346) (7.678) (3.669) (2.680) (1.174) (2.189) (1.255) (0.615) 
LeftGov 1.332 -1.044 7.311*** 5.245** -2.243 0.518 3.486* 2.188* 1.500 4.388*** 0.447 
 (1.518) (1.785) (1.895) (2.308) (7.871) (2.190) (1.788) (1.133) (2.987) (1.057) (1.046) 
Young -0.922 0.759 0.150 -0.480 -1.595 -0.822 -2.882 -0.105 -3.006* -0.435 -0.309 
 (1.472) (0.622) (1.638) (1.044) (5.291) (1.051) (3.860) (0.939) (1.802) (0.927) (0.708) 
Elderly -0.376 -1.447* 0.458 0.470 -4.081* -0.256 4.306 -0.287 -0.088 0.182 -0.887 
 (0.854) (0.760) (1.453) (0.831) (2.363) (1.365) (4.367) (1.393) (1.795) (1.270) (0.538) 
Trend -0.049 0.778** 0.057 -0.037 0.474 -0.320 -0.938 -0.079 -0.855 -0.208 0.173 
 (0.522) (0.312) (0.604) (0.350) (2.144) (0.296) (1.107) (0.223) (0.556) (0.270) (0.287) 
            
            
#Observations 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 
#Countries 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
R-squared 0.163 0.226 0.204 0.273 0.043 0.366 0.072 0.455 0.341 0.355 0.185 
            
            
Other Countries (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
            
Consolidation -0.815 2.552* -1.707** -1.528** 2.316 -2.599 -2.949 -1.643* 0.303 -0.911 -1.179** 
 (0.626) (1.470) (0.716) (0.729) (8.919) (2.837) (2.903) (0.762) (1.226) (0.624) (0.439) 
RealGDPgr 0.097 0.022 -0.568 0.266 -0.805 0.672** 0.849** 0.375* 0.382 0.155 -0.122 
 (0.133) (0.222) (0.757) (0.154) (1.036) (0.258) (0.400) (0.177) (0.288) (0.196) (0.090) 
InterestRate 0.269 0.169 0.437 0.665 0.405 0.069 0.335 0.355 0.569 0.262 0.135 
 (0.421) (0.903) (0.488) (0.658) (1.935) (1.998) (1.992) (0.705) (1.075) (0.791) (0.451) 
Election 2.010** 2.572** -0.155 2.285*** -14.817 1.415 4.476** 2.526*** 1.487 1.445 1.529** 
 (0.746) (1.030) (1.856) (0.813) (14.108) (1.377) (1.707) (0.703) (1.378) (1.014) (0.581) 
LeftGov 0.060 -1.842*** 2.501 0.275 -10.696 3.287 1.426 0.363 1.209 1.140 -1.086 
 (0.984) (0.631) (1.671) (1.589) (10.892) (3.459) (2.839) (0.812) (1.849) (1.617) (0.705) 
Young 0.251 -0.084 0.247 1.479* -3.885 -4.702* -5.624** 1.294 -0.113 0.597 0.237 
 (0.743) (0.233) (1.332) (0.772) (5.914) (2.359) (1.828) (0.721) (1.205) (0.820) (0.913) 
Elderly 0.321 0.380 -0.056 0.823 -4.690 -0.829 -3.320* 0.624 0.759 0.667 0.474 
 (0.628) (0.561) (1.325) (0.584) (4.299) (1.420) (1.739) (0.644) (0.857) (0.617) (0.901) 
Trend -0.047 -0.071 0.101 -0.093* 0.188 -0.691** -0.119 0.017 -0.191* -0.105 -0.153 
 (0.084) (0.076) (0.126) (0.048) (0.225) (0.274) (0.250) (0.061) (0.099) (0.076) (0.108) 
            
            
#Observations 196 196 196 196 196 196 196 196 196 196 196 
#Countries 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
R-squared 0.060 0.086 0.035 0.117 0.024 0.096 0.071 0.125 0.047 0.068 0.082 
            
Notes: See Table 1. Robust standard errors are in parentheses; significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: 
***, 1%; **, 5%; and *, 10%. In the first block of estimations are used only the group of countries named as PIIGS 
(Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain); in the second block are considered only the other ten countries. 
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ANNEX 
 
Table A.1. Description of the Variables 
Variable Description 
  
TotExpd Total general government expenditure. 
PubServ General public services, which comprises the following items: (i) Executive and legislative organs, financial and 
fiscal affairs, and external affairs (ExecAff); (ii) Foreign economic aid (ForAid); (iii) General services (GServ); (iv) 
Basic research (BasicRD); (v) R&D general public services (GServRD); (vi) Other general public services 
(OthServ); (vii) Public debt transactions (DebtTRS); (viii) Transfers of a general character between different levels 
of government (TransfGen). 
Defence Defence expenditures, which comprises the following items: (i) Military defence (MilDef); (ii) Civil defence (CivDef); 
(iii) Foreign military aid (FMilAid); (iv) R&D defence (DefRD); (v) Other defence expenditures (OthDef). 
PubOrder Public order and safety, which comprises the following items: (i) Police services (Police); (ii) Fire-protection 
services (Fire); (iii) Law courts (Courts); (iv) Prisons (Prisons); (v) R&D public order and safety (PubOrdRD); (vi) 
Other public order and safety expenditures (OthPO). 
EconAff Economic affairs expenditures, which comprises the following items: (i) General economic, commercial and labour 
affairs (GenAff); (ii) Agriculture, forestry, fishing and hunting (Agric); (iii) Fuel and energy (Energy); (iv) Mining, 
manufacturing and construction (Constr); (v) Transport (Transp); (vi) Communication (Communic); (vii) Other 
industries (OthInd); (vii) R&D economic affairs (EAffRD); (ix) Other economic affairs expenditures (OthEAff). 
Environm Environmental protection expenditures, which comprises: (i) Waste management (Waste); (ii) Waste water 
management (WastWater); (iii) Pollution abatement (Pollut); (iv) Biodiversity and landscape protection (Protect); 
(v) R&D environmental protection (EnvirRD); (vi) Other environmental protection expenditures (OthEnvir). 
Housing Housing and community amenities, which comprises the following items: (i) Housing development (HousDev); (ii) 
Community development (ComDev); (iii) Water supply (WatSup); (iv) Street lighting (StrLight); (v) R&D housing 
and community amenities (HousRD); (vi) Other housing and community amenities expenditures (OthHous). 
Health Health expenditures, which comprises the following items: (i) Medical products, appliances and equipment 
(MedProd); (ii) Outpatient services (OutPServ); (iii) Hospital services (HospServ); (iv) Public health services 
(PubHlth); (v) R&D health (HlthRD); (vi) Other health expenditures (OthHlth). 
Recreat Recreation, culture and religion expenditures, which comprises the following items: (i) Recreational and sporting 
services (Sports); (ii) Cultural services (Culture); (iii) Broadcasting and publishing services (Broadcast); (iv) 
Religious and other community services (Religious); (v) R&D recreation, culture and religion (RecrRD); (vi) Other 
recreation, culture and religion expenditures (OthRecr). 
Educ Education expenditures, which comprises the following items: (i) Pre-primary and primary education (Prim); (ii) 
Secundary education (Second); (iii) Post-secundary non-tertiary education (PosSec); (iv) Tertiary Education (Tert); 
(v) General education expenditures not defined by level (Genr); (vi) Subsidiary services to education (SubServ); 
(vi) R&D education (EducRD); (viii) Other education expenditures (OthEduc). 
SocProtect Social protection expenditures, which comprises the following items: (i) Sickness and disability (SickDis); (ii) Old 
age (Olders); (iii) Survivors (Survivors); (iv) Family and children (Family); (v) Unemployment protection 
(UnemPrt); (vi) Housing protection (HousPrt); (vii) Social exclusion (SocExcl); (viii) R&D social protection 
(SocPrtRD); (ix) Other social protection expenditures (OthSocP). 
Consolidation Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 in the years in which a fiscal consolidation is implemented; 0 otherwise. 
SpendConsol Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 in the years during which a spending-driven fiscal consolidation is 
implemented; and 0 otherwise; this is defined as the change in the primary expenditure (as percentage of GDP) that 
is larger than 50% of the overall change in the CAPB (as percentage of GDP). 
TaxConsol Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when a tax-driven fiscal consolidation is implemented; 0 otherwise. 
SizeConsol Size of the fiscal consolidation package in percentage of GDP. 
SizeSpendConsol Size of the spending-driven fiscal consolidation in percentage of GDP. 
SizeTaxConsol Size of the tax-driven fiscal consolidation in percentage of GDP. 
DurConsol Duration of the fiscal consolidation programme (in years). 
Debt Government debt as percentage of GDP. 
GBS Government budget surplus before interest payments (primary balance) as percentage of GDP. 
AdjGBS Cyclically adjusted government budget surplus before interest payments (primary balance) as percentage of GDP. 
RealGDPgr Growth rate of real GDP. 
InterestRate Long-term nominal interest rate on government bonds. 
Election Dummy variable that takes de value of 1 in the year of legislative elections; 0 otherwise. 
LeftGov Dummy variable that takes de value of 1 when there is hegemony or dominance of left-wing parties; 0 otherwise. 
Young Percentage of the population between 0 and 14 years of age. 
Elderly Percentage of the population with 65 or more years of age. 
  
Sources: OECD (2009, 2011, 2013, 2015), Government at a Glance; Eurostat (http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database); 
Comparative Political Data Set I (http://www.cpds-data.org/). The data for fiscal consolidations were obtained from 
Devries et al. (2011) for the period 1990-2009 and updated from Kataryniuk and Vallés (2015) for the years 2010-2012 
(both follow a narrative approach). For Greece and Luxembourg, we are consistent with the narrative approach and 
combine the information provided by Kataryniuk and Vallés (2015), Dellepiane and Hardiman (2015) and OECD (2011) 
country notes on Restoring Public Finances to obtain the respective consolidation periods, kind and size.
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Table A.2. Descriptive Statistics 
 Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min. Max. 
      
TotExpd 304 1.927 5.470 -26.934 34.653 
PubServ 304 0.748 6.338 -20.380 29.341 
Defence 304 -0.003 10.920 -70.082 78.868 
PubOrder 304 18.312 272.288 -28.437 474.367 
EconAff 304 0.771 49.520 -68.114 279.137 
Environm 304 3.883 17.288 -73.078 210.175 
Housing 304 2.118 29.849 -93.373 397.462 
Health 304 4.282 19.388 -17.679 321.667 
Recreat 304 3.668 16.316 -36.217 235.357 
Educ 304 2.114 6.088 -19.062 45.758 
SocProtect 304 2.566 4.772 -14.449 21.271 
      
Consolidation 345 0.351 0.478 0.000 1.000 
SpendConsol 345 0.214 0.411 0.000 1.000 
TaxConsol 345 0.125 0.331 0.000 1.000 
SizeConsol 345 0.465 0.976 -0.200 7.800 
SizeSpendConsol 345 0.281 0.616 -0.290 3.800 
SizeTaxConsol 345 0.193 0.491 -0.740 4.100 
DurConsol 345 0.878 1.532 0.000 8.000 
Debt 345 71.466 31.322 4.638 179.868 
GBS 345 0.107 3.689 -28.030 8.113 
AdjGBS 345 0.093 3.336 -23.165 7.899 
      
RealGDPgr 345 2.094 2.776 -8.539 11.272 
InterestRate 337 6.020 3.164 1.403 22.498 
Election 345 0.264 0.441 0.000 1.000 
LeftGov 344 0.259 0.439 0.000 1.000 
Young 345 17.476 2.227 12.809 27.319 
Elderly 345 15.834 2.090 10.767 21.080 
      
Notes: See Table A.1. All government expenditures are in growth rates of the respective real values (base year: 2005). 
Time period: 1990-2012 (annual data); Countries and respective years of fiscal consolidations: Austria (1996-1997, 
2001-2002, 2011-2012), Belgium (1990, 1992-1994, 1996-1997, 2010-2012), Denmark (1995, 2011-2012), Finland 
(1992-1997, 2010-2012), France (1991, 195-1997, 1999-2000, 2011-2012), Germany (1991-1995, 1997-2000, 2003-2004, 
2006-2007, 2011-2012), Greece (1991-1992, 1994-2000, 2010-2012), Ireland (2009-2012), Italy (1991-1998, 2004-2007, 
2011-2012), Luxembourg (1996-1997), Netherlands (1991-1993, 2004-2005, 2011-2012), Portugal (2000, 2002, 
2005-2007, 2010-2012), Spain (1992-1997, 2010-2012), Sweden (1993-1998), United Kingdom (1994-1999, 2010-2012). 
 
 
 
Table A.3. Average growth rates of government expenditures during consolidations and normal times 
 
Consolidation periods Normal times 
 
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
TotExpd 107 -0.026 7.040 -26.934 34.653 197 2.988 4.030 -12.036 14.090 
PubServ 107 1.197 7.429 -15.067 29.341 197 0.505 5.664 -20.380 18.174 
Defence 107 -1.940 12.861 -70.082 44.139 197 1.049 9.578 -46.600 78.868 
PubOrder 107 17.547 259.071 -19.015 474.367 197 19.063 7.795 -28.437 69.622 
EconAff 107 1.398 42.819 -68.939 279.137 197 0.431 52.907 -68.114 140.088 
Environm 107 1.256 23.702 -73.078 210.175 197 5.310 12.346 -19.232 71.116 
Housing 107 -3.139 22.108 -52.758 164.587 197 4.974 33.011 -93.373 397.462 
Health 107 2.981 31.891 -17.679 321.667 197 4.988 5.447 -10.064 33.618 
Recreat 107 2.553 24.632 -36.217 235.357 197 4.274 9.074 -33.502 65.866 
Educ 107 -0.453 6.811 -19.062 21.949 197 3.508 5.163 -11.079 45.758 
SocProtect 107 0.913 4.737 -11.738 20.173 197 3.464 4.558 -14.449 21.271 
Notes: See Tables A.1 and A.2. Government expenditures are in real growth rates (base year: 2005). 
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Table A.4. Panel unit root tests: Im, Pesaran and Shin test 
 Level Growth rate / 1st-Diff. 
 Stat. p-value Stat. p-value 
     
TotExpd 1.6606 0.9516 -8.3716 0.0000 
PubServ 0.7933 0.7862 -6.0609 0.0000 
Defence -0.3946 0.3466 -6.8883 0.0000 
PubOrder 0.7690 0.7791 -6.9157 0.0000 
EconAff -0.2080 0.4176 -9.6827 0.0000 
Environm -0.5905 0.2774 -6.1128 0.0000 
Housing 0.1144 0.5455 -6.4122 0.0000 
Health 2.8627 0.9979 -6.1401 0.0000 
Recreat -0.7601 0.2236 -4.4237 0.0000 
Educ 0.6114 0.7295 -7.1947 0.0000 
SocProtect 3.1508 0.9992 -8.0413 0.0000 
Debt 2.1822 0.9855 -3.7738 0.0001 
GBS -2.8064 0.0025 -9.4788 0.0000 
AdjGBS -2.9966 0.0014 -8.1028 0.0000 
RealGDP 1.4257 0.9230 -5.1036 0.0000 
InterestRate -0.6388 0.2615 -5.5852 0.0000 
Young -4.0402 0.0000 -1.4457 0.0741 
Elderly -7.0569 0.0000 -15.2489 0.0000 
     
Notes: See Table A.1. The tests in the last column for the variables Debt, GBS, AdjGBS and InterestRate are in first 
differences while for the other variables are in growth rates. 
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Table A.5. Endogeneity: IV estimator 
Dep. Vars.: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Growth rate of TotExpd PubServ Defence PubOrder EconAff Environm Housing Health Recreat Educ SocProtect 
            
Consolidation -2.294** 2.524* -2.848** -2.869* 0.550 -7.910** -12.034* -3.430* -2.099 -4.135** -2.988* 
 (1.113) (1.526) (1.304) (1.644) (7.014) (3.584) (6.510) (2.083) (2.484) (1.995) (1.677) 
RealGDPgr 0.957** -0.009 0.743 1.542** -1.548 0.421 3.034* 0.978** 1.538** 0.466 0.011 
 (0.458) (0.424) (0.743) (0.611) (4.462) (1.000) (1.832) (0.496) (0.742) (0.534) (0.369) 
InterestRate -0.339 2.547* -1.160 0.040 -1.515 -1.215 0.326 -1.914** -1.725 -1.410*** -2.395** 
 (0.665) (1.407) (1.440) (0.636) (8.356) (1.203) (1.733) (0.808) (1.132) (0.283) (1.207) 
Election 1.875** 2.403** 1.022 1.682 -10.866 1.819 0.759 3.167*** 2.481* 1.884** 2.222*** 
 (0.890) (0.972) (1.809) (1.075) (8.988) (1.625) (3.068) (0.934) (1.322) (0.876) (0.786) 
LeftGov 0.085 -1.400 3.717* 1.622 -7.491 2.996 0.551 0.864 -0.061 2.441* 0.282 
 (0.988) (1.016) (1.907) (1.224) (4.993) (2.158) (2.200) (0.833) (2.052) (1.301) (1.216) 
Young -0.323 -0.849 0.304 0.236 -3.404 -1.948** -0.124 0.522 -1.370* -0.075 -0.668 
 (0.489) (0.627) (0.612) (0.436) (3.995) (0.981) (1.877) (0.622) (0.746) (0.584) (0.788) 
Elderly -0.207 -0.119 -0.388 -0.044 -4.062** 0.724 0.263 0.390 0.115 0.678 0.214 
 (0.726) (0.572) (1.316) (0.561) (1.894) (0.674) (2.264) (0.667) (0.388) (0.495) (0.835) 
Trend 0.098 -0.132 0.305 0.054 0.169 -0.617** 0.225 0.085 -0.170 -0.149 -0.001 
 (0.137) (0.133) (0.280) (0.146) (0.692) (0.284) (0.685) (0.139) (0.157) (0.121) (0.127) 
            
            
#Observations 286 286 286 286 286 286 286 286 286 286 286 
#Countries 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
Endog.Test 13.79 13.90 6.41 6.99 1.39 5.75 4.82 7.32 7.85 12.60 15.63 
 [0.087] [0.084] [0.601] [0.538] [0.994] [0.676] [0.776] [0.503] [0.448] [0.126] [0.048] 
            
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses; significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 
5%; and *, 10%. The growth rate of the real values of each expenditure component is used as the respective dependent 
variable in each equation. RealGDP is lagged one period and the InterestRate is in first differences. An IV estimator 
controlling for fixed effects is used. Consolidation, RealGRPgr and InterestRate are assumed to be endogenous and are 
instrumented with their lags, the lag of inflation and the lag of the cyclically adjusted deficit. The results of the 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman chi-square test-statistic are reported at the bottom of the table (the respective p-values in square 
brackets). 
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Table A.6. The impact of fiscal consolidations on the real per capita values of each component 
Dep. Vars.: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Growth rate of TotExpd PubServ Defence PubOrder EconAff Environm Housing Health Recreat Educ SocProtect 
            
Consolidation -0.015** 0.022*** -0.029** -0.031*** -0.024 -0.048*** -0.039* -0.035*** -0.029*** -0.027*** -0.014** 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.014) (0.009) (0.029) (0.017) (0.023) (0.007) (0.011) (0.007) (0.006) 
RealGDPgr 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.005*** -0.005 0.010*** 0.008 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.004*** -0.002* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.006) (0.003) (0.006) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
InterestRate -0.002 0.006* -0.016*** -0.006* -0.013 0.006 -0.024* -0.006** -0.005 -0.005* -0.002 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.004) (0.012) (0.007) (0.013) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.002) 
Election 0.017*** 0.029*** 0.011 0.015** 0.008 0.011 0.048 0.025*** 0.021** 0.016** 0.015*** 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.012) (0.007) (0.027) (0.015) (0.030) (0.006) (0.010) (0.006) (0.005) 
LeftGov 0.014 -0.010 0.039** 0.018 0.016 0.028 0.050 0.012 0.011 0.025** 0.006 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.020) (0.012) (0.039) (0.024) (0.045) (0.010) (0.015) (0.010) (0.008) 
Young -0.011* -0.002 -0.003 0.003 -0.056*** -0.058*** -0.091*** 0.003 -0.014* -0.000 -0.005 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.011) (0.006) (0.018) (0.013) (0.026) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.005) 
Elderly -0.011** 0.003 -0.002 0.001 -0.093*** -0.046*** -0.070*** 0.002 -0.002 0.000 -0.003 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.005) (0.022) (0.012) (0.019) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) 
Trend 0.003** -0.000 0.000 0.001 0.013*** 0.004 0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
LagDepVar 0.847*** 0.960*** 0.849*** 0.940*** 0.475*** 0.751*** 0.525*** 0.970*** 0.951*** 0.949*** 0.924*** 
 (0.047) (0.033) (0.037) (0.030) (0.057) (0.040) (0.048) (0.038) (0.031) (0.035) (0.037) 
            
            
#Observations 295 295 295 295 293 295 295 295 295 295 295 
#Countries 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
            
Notes: Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses; significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 
1%; **, 5%; and *, 10%. The logarithm of the real value of each expenditure component per capita is used as dependent 
variable in each equation. A bias-corrected least squares dummy variable (LSDVC) estimator for dynamic panel data 
models is employed (for details, see Bruno 2005a, b). The Blundell and Bond (1998) procedure is used as the initial 
estimator. Following Bloom et al. (2007), we undertake 50 repetitions of the procedure to bootstrap the estimated standard 
errors. The results do not qualitatively change with more repetitions (100, 200 or 500) or when the Arellano and Bond 
(1991) or Anderson and Hsiao (1982) estimator are chosen as initial estimators. RealGDP is lagged one period and the 
InterestRate is in first differences. 
 
 
